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WARNING: DENIAL OF FETAL PROTECTION UNDER TITLE VII
MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO THE HEALTH OF INDUSTRY
AND SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years, an increasing number of chemicals used in
the workplace have been identified as potential reproductive hazards.'
Many employers have responded to these risks by adopting "fetal pro-
tection policies,", 2 which prohibit fertile women3 from working in toxic
environments. 4 These fetal protection policies have created a conflict
with the prohibition against sex discrimination. Because these policies
affect only women's jobs, the courts consider this conflict exclusively in
the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 UA W v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.6 provided the U.S. Supreme Court with the opportunity to
resolve the conflict between employers protecting women's reproduc-
tive health and violating Tide VII by discriminating on the basis of sex.
Instead, the Court's holding left industry with no means of shielding its
female workers from fetal toxics without violating Title VII, and with no
way of protecting itself against potential future liability.
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Johnson Controls.7  Part I explores the background of Title VII, its
amendment by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act s and the confusion of
the federal circuit courts on the proper application of Title VII for de-
termining the validity of fetal protection policies. Part II addresses the
facts of the case and the reasoning adopted by the Court. Part III fo-
cuses upon a general analysis of the case, discusses how the Court's de-
l. Marcelo L. Riffaud, Comment, Fetal Protection and UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Job
Openings for Barren Women Only, 58 FORDHAm L. REV. 843 (1990).
2. Employers who have adopted fetal protection policies include American Cyana-
mid Co., B. F. Goodrich Co., Dow Chemical Co., Environmental Protection & Aeration
Systems, Inc., Firestone, General Motors Corp., Monsanto, Olin Corp. and St. Joe Miner-
als Corp. See Riffaud, supra note 1, at 843 n.3.
3. Fertile women have been defined as all women who are not certifiably sterile. See
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. 1196, 1200 (1991). See also Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982) (all women between ages 5 and 63 are as-
sumed fertile).
4. Several commentators have discussed fetal protection policies. See generally Mary
E. Becker, From Mullerv. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1219 (1986);
Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection
with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981); Meredith L. Ja-
son, Note, International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Controlling Women's Equal Employment
Opportunities Through Fetal Protection Policies, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 453 (1990); Pendleton E.
Hamlet, Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A Statutory Proposal In the Wake of International Union,
UA W v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1110 (1990); Riffaud, supra note 1; Alan
C. Blanco, Comment, Fetal Protection Programs Under Title VII - Rebutting the Procreation Pre-
sumption, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 755 (1985).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
6. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
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cision may affect the future of businesses whose operations expose
workers to fetal-toxic hazards and comments on society's interest in the
problems the decision may create.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees on the basis of race, sex, national ori-
gin or religious beliefs in hiring and employment practices. 9 The provi-
sion was passed to protect racial minorities from historical barriers to
employment. 10 In an unsuccessful attempt to defeat the bill, Congress
added sex to the list of prohibitions against discrimination.1 1 Since the
bill's enactment, courts have vigorously defended women's rights
against job discrimination. 12 Under Title VII, two major claims of dis-
crimination have emerged: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 13
Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment claims arise in two situations. The first is facial
or overt discrimination, which occurs when an employer adopts a prac-
tice or policy of treating women differently from men on the basis of
sex. 14 The only affirmative defense available to an employer for an alle-
gation of facial discrimination is the existence of a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ).15 This statutorily created exception
permits discrimination on the basis of sex only when it is "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise."16
The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the BFOQ excep-
tion. 17 The exception has been found to justify discrimination only if
the employer has a reasonable cause to believe "that all or substantially
all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
10. Hamlet, supra note 4, at 1112.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-
36 n. 15 (1977) (distinguishing disparate treatment from disparate impact claims). See also
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1265-68 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985)
(comparing disparate treatment and disparate impact theories).
14. Williams, supra note 4, at 668.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not bean unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business ....
Id.
16. Id.
17. See UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991) (citing Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 122-25 (1985)).
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the job involved."1 8 For example, the courts have allowed the BFOQ
because of safety concerns (the "safety exception"), but stressed that
such exceptions are applied only in narrow circumstances. 19 The safety
exception has been applied to cases in which there is a concern for the
safety of a third party that is indispensable to the business in question.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,20 the Court determined that hiring only male
guards in a maximum security men's prison was a BFOQ because the
ability to keep order and maintain security was essential to the job where
a woman's presence could pose a threat to herself, other security per-
sonnel and the inmates.2 1 Justice Marshall, in his minority opinion in
Dothard, emphasized that although he did not approve of the "sex dis-
crimination condoned by the majority," he felt that it was fortunate the
majority decision was carefully limited to the facts, namely, the "inhu-
man conditions in Alabama prisons."
'2 2
The Court also found a safety exception in Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell,23 a case arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.24 Affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that to estab-
lish a BFOQan employer must show, among other things, that age can
be legitimately used as a safety-related job qualification when it is not
practicable to deal individually with older employees. 25 Such job quali-
fication must be "reasonably necessary to the essence of his business
[as] here ... safe transportation. .".. -26 Accordingly, courts have up-
held facial sex discrimination in very limited situations.
-the second situation in which a disparate treatment claim arises is
pretextual discrimination. This occurs when an employer adopts a prac-
tice or policy that is facially neutral but the employee asserts that the




A disparate impact claim, by contrast, arises when an employer's
facially neutral policy has a disproportionately adverse effect on one
group (such as women) and not on another (such as men) and is not
18. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
19. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
20. Id. at 321.
21. Id. at 336-37.
22. Id. at 346-47 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 62.1-634.
25. Id. at 414.
26. Id. at 413 (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (1976)).
For cases failing to find a BFOQsafety exception, see Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472
U.S. 353 (1985) (mandatory retirement age for firefighters does not automatically consti-
tute a BFOQin an age discrimination case); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (telephone company failed to prove that heavy lifting and
other job requirements constituted a BFOQ).
27. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); Jason, supra note 4, at 460.
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justified by a business necessity. 28 This might occur, for example, when
an employer bases an employee's salary on past salary.2 9 A disparate
impact may thus be created in a world in which women have historically
been paid less than men.30
Unlike disparate treatment claims, the employer's motive is not sig-
nificant in disparate impact claims because the focus is on the conse-
quences of the employer's practices. 3 1 The only defense available to the
employer for a disparate impact claim is the judicially created business
necessity defense.3 2 Under the business necessity test, the employer
must prove that: (1) there is an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of
the business; (2) the practice effectively carries out the business purpose
it is alleged to serve; and (3) there are no acceptable alternative policies
or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose ad-
vanced, or at least equally accomplish it, with less disparate impact.38
Burdens of Proof
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,3 4 the Supreme Court set forth a
three step scheme for analyzing a disparate treatment case: (1) the em-
ployee's prima facie showing, (2) the employer's articulated reason and
(3) a pretext.3 5 The three steps address only the element of intent to
discriminate for which the employee bears the ultimate burden of prov-
ing that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.3 6 In es-
tablishing her prima facie case, the employee must show that she was
treated differently than a person from another gender or race, that the
employer intended to discriminate and that the difference in her treat-
ment was caused by the employer's intent to discriminate.3 7
An employer can defend an employee's disparate treatment charge
by arguing that there was a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the [plaintiff's] rejection."' 38 The employer must actually articulate a
reason for the action because a simple denial of the intent to discrimi-
nate will not suffice. 39 The "real" limit on what will be accepted as the
employer's reason is credibility.40 The less the reason is based on "job
28. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
29. Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theoy and Limits, 34
AM. U.L. REV. 799, 801 (1985).
30. Id.
31. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
32. Id. at 431 (establishing business necessity defense).
33. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971).
34. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
35. Id. at 802-04.
36. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 5.7, at 277 (2d ed.
1988).
37. Id. § 5.8, at 279-80.
38. Id. § 5.4.4, at 260 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 261.
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performance" or "legitimate needs of the business," the less likely it will
be accepted as the actual reason behind the allegedly discriminatory
treatment.41 To the extent that the employer can introduce rebutal evi-
dence sufficient to overcome the presumption that discrimination was
the reason, a question of fact is created as to whether the employer's
intent was discriminatory or based on a legitimate reason. 42
Once this question of fact is raised, the employee may surrebut the
employer's evidence by focusing on more specific elements of the em-
ployer's behavior than she raised in her prima fade case. She may allege
that the reason asserted by the employer was merely a pretext to hide
the real reason, which was to intentionally discriminate.43 In doing so,
the employee may show that the employer's employment practices and
policies conform to a general pattern of discrimination against a pro-
tected group.
44
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,45 the U.S. Supreme Court held that once
an employee showed a particular employment practice had an adverse
impact upon members of a protected class (thereby establishing a prima
facie case), the employer had the burden of showing that the employ-
ment practice has a "manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion." 46 The Court stated that "[i]f an employment practice that
operates to exclude [members of a protected class] cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. '4
7
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,48 the Supreme Court addressed
the allocation of the burden of proof in a disparate impact case.49 In
that case, a group of plaintiffs claimed that several of the employee se-
lection practices had an adverse impact upon their likelihood of being
hired or promoted.5 0 Although the selection practices used by the em-
ployer were facially fair, they had the practical effect of disqualifying a
disproportionate number of minority group members. The Court held
that an employer carries the burden in a disparate impact case of offer-
ing evidence of business necessity for its employment practice.5 1
Under Wards Cove, once an employee established a prima facie case
of discrimination, the employer merely needed to offer evidence that the
"challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employ-
ment goals of the employer." 52 The employer was not required to-
prove that the challenged practice was "essential" or "indispensable" to
41. Id.
42. Id. at 261-62.
43. Id. § 5.4.5, at 262.
44. Id. at 263.
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Id. at 432.
47. Id. at 431.
48. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
49. Id. at 656.
50. Id. at 647-48.
51. Id. at 659.
52. Id.
1992]
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the employer's business.53 Once such evidence was offered, the em-
ployee carried the ultimate burden of proving that a challenged practice
was either not justified by business necessity or should be considered a
pretext for discrimination for some other reason.5 4 Wards Cove further
held that where plaintiffs sought to prove discrimination based upon a
disparate impact theory, they must identify the specific employment
practice that had the effect of disfavoring them in the selection
process.
55
On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (CRA).56 The Act reverses parts of recent Supreme
Court decisions, including Wards Cove, making it more attractive for em-
ployees to bring discrimination suits by providing increased damages
and jury trials. 57 The CRA addresses Wards Cove in three significant re-
spects. First, the CRA's express purpose is to restore and codify the
concepts of "business necessity" and "job relatedness" as used by the
Supreme Court in Griggs and in other decisions prior to Wards Cove.58
Under the CRA, if the employee is able to establish a prima facie case,
the employer in a disparate impact case can prevail only by demonstrat-
ing either that the challenged practice does not in fact cause the dispa-
rate impact or by proving that the practice is "job related" and justified
by "business necessity."
'5 9
Second, the legislation includes an exception to the Wards Cove re-
quirement that plaintiffs must identify the specific employment practice
that caused the discrimination.6 0 Under the CRA, plaintiffs can treat the
entire decision-making process as one employment practice if they
demonstrate that the elements of the employer's decision-making pro-
cess cannot be separated for purposes of analysis. 6 ' Finally, the CRA
reinforces the principle that claims for disparate treatment and claims
for disparate impact must be treated as distinct by expressly prohibiting
an employer from raising the business necessity defense to a claim for
intentional discrimination. 6 2
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Prior to 1978, there were mixed views concerning how childbearing
or pregnancy discrimination fit into a Title VII analysis. During the
early 1970s, federal courts generally interpreted sex discrimination laws
broadly to include protection of pregnant women and those with
53. Id.
54. Id. at 659, 660.
55. Id. at 657.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071
[hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1991].
57. Id. at 1072-73.
58. Id. at 1071.
59. Id. at 1074.
60. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
61. Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 56, at 1074.
62. Id. at 1075.
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childbearing capacity. 63 In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) adopted guidelines stating that Title VII prohib-
ited policies disadvantaging women because of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions.64 Lower courts interpreted these guidelines
to mean that pregnancy discrimination constituted sex discrimination,
which could only be justified by the BFOQ exception.
65
Despite the view generally held by the EEOC and the courts, the
Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 66 held that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy did not fall within sex discrimination under
Title VII.67 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reasoned that ex-
cluding pregnancy-related disabilities from an employer's disability in-
surance program had not been shown to have a disparate impact on
women.68 The Court characterized the program as covering all risks
shared by men and women and providing an insurance package worth as
much to women as to men.69 The exclusion of pregnancy was merely
the elimination of an extra disability unique to women.7 0 In response to
Gilbert and similar other cases, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act (PDA).7 1 The PDA amended the definition of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII to include discrimination "on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .... 72
C. Application of Title VII and the PDA to Fetal Protection Policies
Prior to UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and since the passage of Title
VII, there had been only three reported circuit court cases in which a
plaintiff used Title VII as the basis for attacking fetal protection poli-
cies.73 An amicus brief filed in Johnson noted that these cases "devised
63. See Williams, supra note 4, at 673-74 n. 193 (listing pregnancy discrimination cases
prior to the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1991). The EEOC guidelines state: "A written orunwrit-
ten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or employ-
ees because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is a prima facie
violation of title VII." Id.
65. See Williams, supra note 4, at 673-74 (identifying decisions during the 1970s as the
first phase of pregnancy-based discrimination jurisprudence under Title VII).
66. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
67. Id. at 136.
68. Id. at 138.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 139.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
72. Id. The PDA provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other per-
sons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
Id.
73. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986
(5th Cir. 1982). A number of early cases were settled, see Williams, supra note 4, at 642
n.l 1. See also Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (early fetal
protection case, it was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds). For a case decided following
the Seventh Circuit decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1992]
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convoluted methodologies" in order to treat fetal protection policies as
"gender neutral" practices with only an incidental disparate impact on
women,74 thus allowing employers to defend their fetal protection poli-
cies by using the business necessity defense.
75
In Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital,76 the plaintiff argued that she
had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that
her employer's facially neutral policy of terminating pregnant x-ray tech-
nicians burdened women's employment opportunities without affecting
those of men. The plaintiff also contended that the hospital had failed
to establish a valid business necessity defense for the policy. 77 Zuniga,
the first female x-ray technician to be hired at the hospital, was informed
that if she became pregnant, she would have to resign or be terminated,
and she would not be entitled to maternity leave. 78 She subsequently
became pregnant and was told to resign or be fired.
7 9
The Fifth Circuit, noting that the PDA did not apply because the
termination occurred prior to its effective date,80 used a benefit/burden
analysis in ruling that Zuniga had established a prima facie case of sex
discrimination.8 1 Next, the court found that the hospital could have uti-
lized an "alternative, less discriminatory means of achieving its business
purpose." 8 2 By examining the hospital's leave of absence policy, the
court found that a leave of absence could be granted for, among other
things, family health,8 3 and to prevent "fetal death, congenital abnor-
malities, small head, mongolian, or missing organs ... ."84 The court
thus held that the same reason cited by the hospital for terminating
Zuniga could have justified giving her a leave of absence.8 5 Because the
hospital failed to use a less discriminatory alternative, its business pur-
pose was determined a pretext and the business necessity defense
failed. 86 The court declined to consider whether avoidance of tort lia-
bility might constitute a business necessity, but acknowledged that
"[a]lthough concern over fetal health alone is arguably not the province
of the employer, but of the mother" a tort suit brought by a deformed
child could be a financial burden, seriously disrupting the safe and effi-
1989), see Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying BFOQ
standard to fetal protection policies).
74. See Brief of the State of California and the California Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1215) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
75. Id.
76. 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 989. The court did not consider the issue of whether the impact of the
hospital's policy was a form of disparate treatment.
78. Id. at 988.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 989 n.6.
81. Id. at 991.
82. Id. at 992.
83. Id. at 992, 993.
84. Id at 993.
85. Id. at 993-94.
86. Id. at 994.
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cient operation of the business.8 7
Two weeks after the decision in Zuniga, the Fourth Circuit decided
Wright v. Olin Corp..88 Wright was the first fetal protection policy case
reviewed after the effective date of the PDA. The plaintiffs alleged that
Olin's fetal protection policy was a pervasive effort to limit womens' ad-
vancement or seniority.8 9 The allegations appeared to resemble a "clas-
sic case" of covert discrimination under disparate treatment as applied
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,90 which Olin disputed by contending
that the plaintiffs failed to prove disparate treatment as they failed to
prove that the business reason-fetal protection-was pretextual.9 1
The plaintiffs went on to argue that McDonnell Douglas did not apply.
They claimed that their undisputed evidence showed an overt intent to
discriminate on the part of Olin because the program had a manifestly
adverse effect upon the employment opportunities of women only.
9 2
The conflict between the parties was whether Olin had the burden of
articulating a nondiscriminatory business reason for the fetal protection
policy or instead had the burden of proving an affirmative defense by
the BFOQ or business necessity.
93
The Fourth Circuit conceded its difficulty in making the facts of this
case fit into a Title VII analysis but concluded that the disparate impact/
business necessity analysis was the most appropriate standard to ap-
ply.94 The court ruled that the disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis was
inappropriate as it would prevent the employer from asserting a busi-
ness justification defense that it would otherwise be entitled to assert
under Title VII.95
There were obvious policy reasons for the court's decision to apply
the disparate impact/business necessity analysis. The court justified its
decision on the conclusion that the distinction between facial discrimi-
nation and disparate impact should not prevent an employer from rais-
ing fetal safety as a justification for discriminating on the basis of
pregnancy.96 The court believed the defenses were distinguishable,
noting that the business necessity defense was "obviously wider" than
the BFOQ defense.97 The court recognized the social implications of
the problem, but noted that any answers are the subject of national pol-
icy, which has not been addressed by Congress.98 This case was the
87. Id. at 992 & n.10.
88. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 1179.
90. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
91. Id. at 1183; Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 5.
92. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1183.
93. Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 6 & n.3 (stating that after Wards Cove, the business
defense is no longer an affirmative defense for disparate impact discrimination).
94. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1184-85 & n.21.
95. Id. at 1185 n.21. The court also rejected the PDA as "conceptually unsound." Id.
at 1184 n.17.
96. Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 7.
97. Idl at 8 (citing Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21).
98. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1188.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
court's attempt to "divine" congressional intent.9 9 Hence, because the
BFOQ is such a narrow defense that could not be established here,
10 0
the court had to look to a broader statutory framework and judicial
interpretation. 101
Two years after Wright, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the fetal pro-
tection issue in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital.10 2 Shelby Memorial
Hospital fired Hayes, an x-ray technician, after she advised her supervi-
sor of her pregnancy.' 0 3 The hospital claimed that Hayes was termi-
nated because exposure to ionizing radiation might harm the fetus and
because the hospital was unable to find alternative employment for
her.10 4 Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Wright, the Eleventh Circuit recog-
nized that under Title VII, as amended by the PDA, a policy based on
pregnancy cannot be deemed neutral. 10 5 The court initially determined
Hayes was a facial discrimination case,10 6 finding that if an employer can-
not overcome the burden of proving that its policy is not facially dis-
criminatory, its only defense is the BFOQ' 0 7 Therefore, the court held
that unless the hospital could show a direct relationship between the
policy and a fertile or pregnant woman's actual ability to perform her
job, the hospital's defense would fail.10 8 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
similar to the Wright court, looked to the business necessity defense to
find a lower standard than that required to prove a BFOQ.1 9 It sought
to find a way to make the employer's pregnancy-based discrimination a
facially neutral policy with an "incidental" disparate impact." 0 The
court allowed the hospital to rebut an employer's prima facie case of
facial discrimination by proving "that a policy applying only to women
or pregnant women employees is justified on a scientific basis and is not
necessary to protect the offspring of male employees .... "" I In so
proving, the court reasoned, the employer has proven that the policy is
neutral in that it protects offspring of all employees.1 2 Nevertheless,
because the policy has a disproportionate impact on women, even if the
employer rebuts the presumption, the employee still has an automatic
prima facie case of disparate impact.' 1 3 However, under the disparate
impact analysis, the employer has the "wider" business necessity
defense.
The court also rejected the hospital's argument that avoidance of
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1186 n.21.
101. Id. at 1188.
102. 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 1546.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1547.
106. Id. at 1547-48.
107. Id. at 1549.
108. Id.
109. See Amicus Brief, supra note 74, at 10.
110. Id.
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potential tort liability is a business necessity defense.' 14 It stated that
potential liability is too contingent and broad to be considered a busi-
ness necessity. 15 Although an employer could be justified in dismissing
an employee for not complying with safety procedures designed to pro-
tect the employee or the employee's offspring, the court noted that the
focus is on health and safety and not possible litigation.
16
The circuit courts had stretched to find that fetal protection policies
should be analyzed under a disparate impact theory affording employers
the "less narrow" business necessity defense. It was at this stage that




Johnson Controls, Inc. (Johnson) is a manufacturer of automotive
and specialty batteries of which lead is a principle component.1 8 Be-
cause of the toxicity of lead, Johnson has a comprehensive hygiene pro-
gram for controlling employees' lead exposure and absorption.
Further, in response to the mounting evidence of the significant health
risks of exposure to lead, and at the specific urging of its plant physi-
cians and outside medical consultants, Johnson, in 1982, adopted a fetal
protection policy designed to protect unborn children and their mothers
from the harmful effects of lead exposure. 19 The policy excluded wo-
men of childbearing capacity from working in environments in which
their blood-lead level could rise above thirty micrograms.' 2 0 It pro-
vided that fertile or pregnant women would not be hired for, or be al-
lowed to transfer into, jobs in which the lead exposure was excessive,
nor would they be hired for, or be allowed to transfer into, any position
from which they could be promoted to a position with excessive expo-
sure to lead.' 2 ' Female employees were required to medically docu-
ment their inability to have children before they would be considered
for these positions.' 2 2 The women removed from their jobs as a result
of the policy were transferred to other positions at Johnson without loss
of pay or benefits.' 2 3 International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, United Auto
Workers and a group of individual employees (UAW), brought a class
114. Id. at 1552-53 n.15.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
118. Id. at 1199.
119. Johnson adopted the policy after research showed that a woman's exposure to
lead can harm a fetus at a lower blood-lead level than that which causes harm in an adult
and could injure the fetus even before a woman knows she is pregnant. Id. at 1199-1200.
120. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871,876 (7th Cir. 1989), revud, 111 S. Ct.
1196 (1991).
121. Id. at 877.
122. Id. at 876 n.8.
123. Id. at 876.
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action suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, alleging that Johnson's fetal protection policy violated Title
VII by discriminating on the basis of sex.
124
B. Lower Court Rulings
The district court granted summary judgment for Johnson, apply-
ing the business necessity test.125 The Seventh Circuit affirmed en banc
the district court's summary judgment in favor ofJohnson. 126 The ma-
jority directly acknowledged the decisions in Wright and Hayes holding
that the business necessity defense can be appropriately applied to fetal
protection policy cases under Title VII. 1 27 The circuit court concluded
that Johnson Controls had shown that a fetal protection policy was a
reasonable necessity for industrial safety.
128
The Seventh Circuit also analyzed the fetal protection policy under
the BFOQ defense. Citing Dothard v. Rawlinson,129 the court recognized
that in resolving whether a BFOQ was valid depended on the employer
reasonably believing that all or substantially all fertile women would be
unable to perform the job safely and efficiently. 130 The court concluded
that Johnson's policy was supported by a BFOQ defense.' 3 ' With this
decision, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit court to hold that a
fetal protection policy could be upheld as a BFOQ.
3 2
C. The Majority
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in
UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 13 3 which reversed the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision. The Court concluded that Johnson could not establish that its
policy met the BFOQexception to Title VII. 13 4 The opinion was based
on the plain language of the PDA, which prohibits employers from dis-
criminating against female employees because of their ability to become
pregnant.13 5 The Court interpreted the PDA as providing that a policy
based on pregnancy is facially discriminatory and the employer's only
defense is a BFOQ.
3 6
The Court began with a departure from the views of Wright and
Hayes. Those courts had reasoned that the challenged fetal protection
124. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1988), af'd, 886
F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
125. Id. at 316-17.
126. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 887.
128. Id. at 897-98.
129. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
130. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 897.
131. Id. at 898.
132. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1202 (1991).
133. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
134. Id. at 1198, 1207.
135. Id. at 1198, 1203.
136. Id. at 1203-04 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669, 684 (1983)).
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policies were facially neutral.1 3 7 Employers were therefore allowed to
justify their policies under the business necessity defense. 13 8 The Court
established that Johnson's policy was not neutral because it did not ap-
ply equally to men and women. 13 9 Men were allowed to choose whether
they wanted to work in ajob that was a risk to their reproductive health.
The Court also noted that, even though Johnson's policy may not have
had a discriminatory intent, that was not sufficient to convert the overtly
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory
effect. 140
The Court supported its finding that Johnson's policy was facially
discriminatory by using the language of the PDA to show that, for all
Title VII purposes, discrimination because of pregnancy is facial dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. 14 1 Because Johnson chose to treat all
female employees as if they could become pregnant, the Court con-
cluded the policy demonstrated such discrimination.
Next, the Court turned to the issue of whether Johnson should be
allowed to discriminate on the basis of sex by proving that its fetal pro-
tection policy was a BFOQ. For this purpose, the Court reiterated the
restrictive scope of the BFOQas applied in its prior decisions in Dothard
v. Rawlinson142 and Western Air Linesj, Inc. v. Criswell.143 Johnson argued
that its fetal protection policy fit into the safety exception, a judicially
recognized BFOQ.14 4 Refusing to expand the safety exception to fetal
protection policies, the Court reasoned that neither conceived nor un-
conceived fetuses can be considered third parties indispensable to the
battery manufacturing business. 145 The Court cited Judge Easter-
brook's dissenting opinion in the Seventh Circuit's decision in which he
observed that it was a play on words to say that "the job" atJohnson to
manufacture batteries without risk to the fetus was the same as "the job"
at Western Airlines to fly-planes without crashing. 14 6 The Court limited
the safety exception to those situations where sex or pregnancy affected
the employees' ability to perform their jobs. 14 7 The Court disposed of
the concern for employers' tort liability raised by Justice White in his
concurring opinion by stating that, if an employer fully informs the wo-
man of the risks involved in the job, and has not acted negligently, there
is but a remote chance that the employer will be held liable. 14 8 Based
on these findings, the Court ruled that Johnson failed to establish a
137. Id. at 1203.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1203-04.
141. Id. at 1203.
142. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
143. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
144. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 1205.
145. Id. at 1206.
146. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1207 (citing UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 913 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting)).
147. Id. at 1206.
148. Id. at 1208.
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BFOQ and therefore its policy violated Title VII as amended by the
PDA.
D. The Concurring Opinions
There were two concurring opinions in the Johnson case. First, in a
brief opinion, Justice Scalia elaborated on Judge Easterbrook's view by
saying that not only was Johnson prohibited from excluding fertile wo-
men from jobs, but that Title VII also gives employees the power to
make employment decisions that affect their families. 149 He also ad-
dressed the question of whether an employer's compliance under Title
VII is required even if it violates state tort law by stating that it is reason-
able to believe that Title VII has "accommodated" state tort law
through the BFOQ exception.'
50
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ken-
nedy, wrote a separate concurring opinion agreeing with the majority
that Johnson's fetal protection policy was facially discriminating and
constituted a violation of Title VII unless a BFOQ exception could be
proven.1 51 Justice White's opinion, however, criticized the majority for
reading the BFOQ defense so narrowly that it could never be used to
warrant a sex-specific fetal protection policy. 15 2 According to Justice
White, the majority's interpretation of the BFOQ defense meant that
even pregnant women could not be prevented from working in areas of
high exposure to chemicals toxic to their fetuses.'
5 3
Justice White argued that avoiding substantial tort liability is ajusti-
fication for preventing women from working in certain jobs. 15 4 He also
voiced his displeasure with the majority's view that employers have little
to fear from liability suits if they inform women of the risk, and if the
employer has not acted negligently. He found this to be of little comfort
to employers, since: (1) it is not clear whether Title VII preempts state
tort liability; and (2) even though employers may avoid claims brought
by employees, they cannot escape the claims brought by injured chil-
dren. 155 Justice White considered the general rule that parents cannot
waive their children's rights to sue because of the parents' own negli-
gence. 156 Every state currently allows children born alive to sue in tort
for prenatal injuries caused by the negligence of third parties.' 57 Fur-
thermore, an increasing number of jurisdictions have allowed recovery
for torts causing prenatal injuries prior to conception.
158
In his opinion, Justice White argued that the majority's limiting of
149. Id. at 1216 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1210 (White, J, concurring).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1214.
154. Id. at 1210.
155. Id. at 1211.
156. Id. at 1211.
157. Id. at 1210-11.
158. Id.
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the safety exception to those situations where sex or pregnancy affected
the employees' ability to perform their jobs did not support. its conclu-
sion that a fetal protection policy could not be justified as a BFOQ.159
Justice White asserted that Dothard and Criswell made it clear that avoid-
ing substantial safety risks to third parties was not only an inherent part
of an employee's ability to perform a job, but also an inherent part of
the usual operations of an employer's business. 160 He pointed out that
protecting fetuses while performing the duties of battery manufacturing
was as legitimate a concern as was the safety of prison inmates or airline
passengers.' 6 1 Furthermore, Justice White noted that the legislative
history of Title VII gives examples of permissible sex discrimination,
and in none of those situations did sex interfere with the employee's
ability to perform the job.' 6 2 Disagreeing with the majority's claim that
the PDA restricted the use of the BFOQ defense, Justice White con-
tended that Congress did not intend for the PDA to alter an employer's
defenses under Title VII. Congress intended to redefine sex discrimina-
tion to include pregnancy and childbirth but not to change, in any other
way, how Title VII is applied to sex discrimination. 163
Although he disagreed with the majority's narrow application of the
BFOQdefense, Justice White concluded thatJohnson's fetal protection
policy reached too far in excluding all fertile women, regardless of age,
and in excluding women from jobs that might advance into positions in
which the duties require high quantities of lead exposure.164 He also
agreed thatJohnson had not shown that its policy was reasonably neces-
sary to its usual business operations, as Johnson had incurred no in-
crease in fetal risk or associated costs since the implementation of its
fetal protection policy in 1982.165
III. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in Johnson concluded that sex-specific fetal
protection policies are not legal under Title VII unless the safety of third
parties is related to job performance and is relevant to an employee's
ability to perform the assigned tasks. This decision has the effect of say-
ing that under Title VII, employers are allowed to consider only produc-
tion-related concerns and are prohibited from recognizing external
societal/moral judgments in determining how businesses should oper-
ate. The opinion is inconsistent with relevant precedents, statutory lan-
guage and the legislative history. It also exhibits a total disregard for
the employer's legal duty and society's interest in the health of its mem-
bers. Protecting third parties, including fetuses, from serious health and
159. Id. at 1213.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1214 n.8. The examples were a female nurse hired to care for an elderly
woman, an all-male baseball team, a masseur and a washroom attendant. Id.
163. Id. at 1214.
164. Id. at 1215.
165. Id.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
safety risks arising directly out of the manufacturing process is reason-
ably necessary to a responsible employer's normal operation and thus
can constitute a BFOQin narrow circumstances.
A. Relevant Precedents, Statutory Language and Legislative History
Each circuit court considering the issue prior to Johnson has strug-
gled with the limits on the BFOQas a defense to facially discriminatory
fetal protection policies. In Wright, the court was admittedly attempting
to find the "probable" congressional intent in the absence of specific
congressional expression regarding fetal protection policies.' 66 In or-
der to find those answers, the court had to devise a way to instead apply
a business necessity defense, providing more latitude to explore the
conflict between fetal safety and sex discrimination. In Hayes, although
the court acknowledged the presumption that the fetal protection policy
was facially discriminatory and ruled that the district court's findings of
fact were sufficient to support a holding of facial discrimination, it al-
lowed the employer to rebut the presumption of a disparate impact in
order to be "completely fair" to the employer.' 6 7 Thus, it was clear
from these cases that the courts were reaching for a reasonable solution
to fetal protection policies.
The Supreme Court in Johnson rejected the precedent set by the cir-
cuit courts and essentially disposed of the disparate impact analysis and
business necessity defense for fetal protection policies, leaving only a
BFOQ defense, which the court applies only under the most extreme
circumstances. The majority in Johnson also pointed to its decisions in
Dothard and Criswell to support its restrictive interpretation of the safety
exception as a BFOQ. As Justice White indicated in his concurring
opinion, protecting fetal safety while performing the duties of battery
manufacturing is as legitimate a concern as is the safety of prison in-
mates and airline passengers. 168 In the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Johnson, the court acknowledged that the safety exception in Dothard was
extremely limited because more was at stake than a woman's decision to
accept the risks of employment in a maximum security male prison.
169
However, the court felt that there was similarly more at stake than a
woman's decision to work in a high lead exposure such as the "intellec-
tual and physical development" of her unborn child.1 7 0 The Seventh
Circuit feared that a female employee could somehow "rationally dis-
count" the ultimate risk, believing that her baby would not be harmed
from lead exposure.' 7 1 Therefore, the court held that since "more is at
stake" than the woman's right to make an employment decision, Dothard
served as support for the conclusion that a fetal protection policy consti-
166. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1189 (4th Cir. 1982).
167. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11 th Cir. 1984).
168. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1213 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring).
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tuted a BFO. 1 72
The Supreme Court's majority decision also found that the PDA
established a BFOQ standard that all pregnant employees must be
treated the same as other employees unless they differ in their ability or
inability to perform the required work. 173 As Justice White argued, the
PDA simply amended the definition of sex under Title VII without elimi-
nating or altering the BFOQdefense. 174 The PDA merely clarified Title
VII to make it clear that pregnancy was included in the protection pro-
vided under Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions. 175 The legislative
history of the PDA described pregnancy and related conditions as part
of the definition of sex under Title VII, but "it does not change the
application of Title VII to sex discrimination in any other way."' 176 The
House report also stated that the "pregnancy-based" distinctions would
be applied the same way as other proscribed acts of sex discrimina-
tion. 177 Furthermore, the majority failed to offer any explanation of
why Congress might have intended a measure, designed in part to pro-
tect fetal health, to be construed as requiring an employer to expose the
unborn child to toxic hazards known to cause irreparable brain dam-
age.178 As the Supreme Court counseled in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
"[w]e need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we inter-
pret a statute."
179
B. Employer's Legal Duty
Johnson has a legal duty to avoid injuries to the unborn child that
result directly from the toxic hazards of Johnson's own manufacturing
operations. The majority acknowledged that over forty states now rec-
ognize a right to recover for prenatal injuries based either on negligence
or wrongful death.' 80 What the majority failed to acknowledge is that
the child itself, if born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to
bring an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries.'18 There are
also a small number of courts that have allowed a cause of action for
recovery by children who have not yet even been conceived when the
harmful contact with the mother occurs. 182 Contrary to the majority's
suggestion that an employer might discharge this duty simply by cau-
172. Id. at 898.
173. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 1206.
174. Id. at 1213 (White, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1214 (quoting S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1977))(empha-
sis omitted).
177. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4752).
178. Brief for Respondent at 34, UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989) (No. 89-1215).
179. Id.
180. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 1208.
181. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 at 368
(5th ed. 1984).
182. Id. at 369 & nn.24-26.
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tioning its employees about the risks and leaving the choice to the em-
ployee, the employer's duty runs directly to the fetus or potential fetus.
It is difficult to estimate Johnson's exposure to tort liability. How-
ever, given today's litigious society, it is an important consideration. 183
As an example, it was mass tort suits that drove the asbestos industry
into bankruptcy.18 4 For Johnson and other similarly situated compa-
nies, compensatory and punitive damages awarded in tort suits brought
by lead-poisoned children could easily put them out of business. This
decision makes that possibility more of a reality.
C. Society's Interest in the Health of its Members
Whether society's interest is characterized as fulfilling reasonably
perceived legal duties or simply as promoting the overriding interest in
the health and safety of children, properly implemented fetal protection
policies serve a greater public good than merely protecting employers
from lawsuits.18 5 Society has an unquestionable interest in the health of
its members, including children.18 6 An employer's adoption of policies
protective of the health of its employees and their families, consumers
or persons living near its facility is a social good that should be en-
couraged. As the country becomes increasingly burdened by industry's
hazardous products, by-products and wastes, the government has in-
creased its requirement, at a substantial expense to industry, that
health-fetal health included-become a corporate concern.
18 7
It seems easy to understand how Johnson's policy could be con-
strued as the offensive intrusion of "reproductive police" into the work-
place.18 8 The majority's holding in Johnson may be read to support that
view by finding that fetal protection policies violate Title VII by not al-
lowing women to freely choose whether or not to work around fetal tox-
ics. 18 9 The wrong choice, however, may create cause for public
concern. For example, at least one out of eight women who. had chil-
dren while working in high-lead environments gave birth to a child suf-
fering from lead poisoning. 190 Families with lead-poisoned children
may be required to turn to a "deep pocket" such as government or in-
dustry for help. 191 Just as babies of cocaine addicts require hundreds of
thousands of dollars to survive, lead-poisoned children with irreversible
mental retardation require expensive care and frequently institutional-
ization at taxpayer or corporate expense.
192
183. Id. at 905.
184. Id.
185. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 n.15 (11th Cir. 1984).
186. See Williams, supra note 4, at 645.
187. Id.
188. Arlynn L. Presser, Should "Fetal Protection" Policies Be Upheld? Yes: For Risky Busi-
nesses, A.B.A. J., June 1990 at 38.
189. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209-10 (1991).
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CONCLUSION
InJohnson, the United States Supreme Court missed an opportunity
to modernize Title VII by broadening the BFOQdefense into a tool for
balancing rights and, in the instant case, by balancing sexual equality in
the workplace against threats to the health and safety of unborn or un-
conceived children from toxic manufacturing operations. If fetal protec-
tion policies are strictly prohibited, as analyzed under this Court's
version of a BFOQ standard, many companies will have to abandon
these policies or go out of business as a result of substantial tort liability.
Clearly, companies will have no defense for Title VII allegations under
this restrictive interpretation of the BFOQbecause they will not be able
to prove that the women excluded cannot perform the physical tasks of
their jobs.
Further, this decision equates an employer's efforts to honor its per-
ceived legal obligation with a concern merely for the balance sheet. The
fairness of forcing an employer knowingly to expose a fetus to its haz-
ardous substances and processes and then be required to compensate
for the consequences should be examined. The consequences of a tort
suit could be financially devastating, seriously disrupting the safe and
efficient operations of the business.
1 93
Finally, this decision, if carried out, will create a risk to society. If
and when a business discontinues operations, for whatever reason, the
burden will be shifted to society to establish programs to train and main-
tain handicapped children or to teach children to cope with the mental
and physical injuries which could result from lead exposure or other fe-
tal-toxic hazards in the workplace.
Shirley A. Levy
193. See Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982).
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